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Direct Participants’ Behavior Through the Lens
of Transactional Analysis: The Case of SPEI R
Biliana Alexandrova-Kabadjova, Antoaneta Serguieva, Ronald Heijmans,
and Liliana Garcia-Ochoa
Abstract This paper presents a methodology to study the flow of funds in large
value payment systems (LVPSs). The presented algorithm separates the flow of
payments in two categories: (1) external funds, i.e. funds transferred from other
financial market infrastructures (FMIs) or provided by the central bank and (2)
the reuse of incoming payments. Our method further studies the flow of intraday
liquidity under the framework of its provision within the Mexican FMIs. The aim
is to evaluate the impact of the intraday liquidity provision, and understand how
liquidity is transmitted to participants in the Mexican LVPS SPEI R.
19.1 Introduction
The worldwide economic crisis has revealed that liquidity problems of (large)
banks can occur suddenly, and with serious consequences for the (global) financial
stability. The Lehman Brothers’ collapse in 2008 is the most recent and widely
referred to example. The interest, by both academics and financial authorities (such
as central banks), in intraday liquidity management has gained momentum since
then. Studying intraday liquidity flows, gives valuable insight into: (1) the provision
of liquidity and the level of efficient use, (2) potential liquidity risks in settling
payment obligations, and (3) the degree of interdependencies between financial
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market infrastructures (FMIs) in terms of liquidity, in particular between the large
value payment and securities settlement systems (LVPSs and SSSs). Central banks
can use this insight to improve the intraday liquidity provision, to enhance the legal
documentation of FMIs and to improve the implementation of the Principles of
Financial market Infrastructures (PFMIs, see [1]).
To smoothen settlement of transactions in the FMIs, central banks provide
(intraday) liquidity to participants in their LVPS. This liquidity together with
liquidity from their payment obligations flow through different FMIs. Then liquidity
is redistributed among participants either as transfers, payment obligations or
secured/unsecured lending/borrowing among them. By studying liquidity flows
central banks gain insight in the emerging network among participants revealing
the structure of interdependency among financial institutions. Given that some
of these institutions are direct participants in more than one FMI, the overall
network of funds transfers among FMIs must be taken into account. Furthermore,
central banks obtain information on the behavior of the participants related to the
intraday liquidity management, i.e. the decisions during the day with respect to the
number/value of payment obligations. We have identified three factors affecting the
decision on how many payment orders will be sent for settlement by a participant
throughout the day: (1) the amount of central bank money this participant has access
to, (2) the amount of funds in terms of borrowing the institution can obtain from
other participants, if required, and (3) the volume of payments received due to
existing obligations either towards the participant or to its clients in a particular
moment of the day.
Most countries in the industrialized world have implemented real time gross
settlement (RTGS) systems (see [2]). In comparison to deferred net settlement
(DNS) systems, RTGS eliminate settlement and credit risk that could arise between
participants in the netting system. Nevertheless RTGS increase pressure on the level
of intraday liquidity used to fulfill payment obligations, for that reason the most
analysis on large value payment systems focuses on RTGS systems rather than
netting. This paper defines a methodology to study the flow of funds observed in
LVPSs related to funds transferred from other FMIs or provided by a central bank
(first factor above), and the reuse of incoming payments (the second and third factors
above). Under the specific operational rules used by the Mexican LVPS SPEI R, an
algorithm is developed, using individual transaction data, to distinguish to what
extent incoming payments are used to cover obligations. The time-scale of the
algorithm is determined by the settlement rules of the system, which is every 3 s.
In this study we present different time profiles, which are created under the same
frequency of seconds. For more details of the operation framework, please refer to
[3]. In comparison to other RTGS, SPEI R processes a high volume of transactions in
real time settlement—on average 853,000 daily during 2013. From those operation
around 91 % correspond to payments with value lower than 10,000 EUR.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 19.2 provides a brief literature
overview. Section 19.3 describes the three different liquidity related issues: (1) the
mechanism of liquidity provision, (2) distinguishing between the use of external
funds and incoming payments, and (3) the profiles of daily, weekly and hourly
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activities in the Mexican LVPS SPEI R. Section 19.4 concludes and gives final
remarks.
19.2 Literature Review
The focus of this paper is on liquidity flows and intraday patterns in (the Mexican)
LVPS. This section reviews recent literature on LVPS flows and pattern, along with
further research topics providing insight into FMI (data) analysis.
Armantier et al. [4] seek to quantify how the changing environment in which
Fedwire (the largest LVPS of the United States) operates has affected the timing
of payment value transferred within the system. They observe several trends in
payment timing from 1998 to 2006. After 2000, the peak in payment activity
shifts to later in the day. Indeed, post-2000, a greater concentration of payments
occurs after 17:00. At the same time, however, several factors have been associated
with increased payment activity early in the day, such as (1) the creation of the
Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS) Bank, an institution that settles U.S. dollar
payments early in the morning, (2) changes to the Clearing House Interbank Pay-
ments System’s (CHIPS) settlement practices and (3) expanded Fedwire operating
hours. Despite these developments, they find that the distribution of payment activity
across the day still peaks more in the late afternoon.
Becher et al. [5] investigate the factors influencing the timing and funding
of payments in the CHAPS Sterling system (the British LVPS), drawing where
appropriate on comparisons with payment activity in Fedwire. Their results show
that the settlement of time-critical payments in CHAPS supplies liquidity early in
the day. Liquidity can be recycled to fund less urgent payments. CHAPS throughput
guidelines also provide a centralized coordination mechanism that essentially limits
any tendency toward payment delay. The relatively small direct membership of
CHAPS further facilitates coordination, enabling members to maintain a constant
flux of payments during the day.
In RTGS systems the liquidity demand is relatively high, due to the fact that
each transaction is settled individually, and it is preferable that banks do not
(unnecessarily) delay payments, as this will directly have an effect on the liquidity
position of their counterparties. Participants choosing to pay after receiving its
incoming payments are known as freeriders. Diehl [6] addresses the question of how
free riding in LVPSs should be measured properly. He developed several measures
for identifying free riding, which can be measured at individual bank level. His
analysis shows that a combination of at least two measures is recommended for
capturing the effects of free riding. Diehl’s results are based on nine important
banks in the German part of TARGET (the European LVPS system). The evaluated
measures show stable payment behavior of most participants over time. However,
his results also show some remarkable regime shifts, which indicate interesting
insights about a single participant.
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Massarenti et al. [7] studied the intraday patterns and timing of all TARGET2
interbank payments, and the evolution of settlement delay. One of their results shows
that the first hour and a half and the last hour are the most crucial times during the
system’s operating hours, in terms of the numbers of payments processed (opening
hours) and value of payments (closing hour). Their analysis provides only a system-
wide view and can be used by operators and overseers of central banks.
Heijmans and Heuver [8] looked at the different liquidity elements which can
be identified from LVPS transaction data. They developed a method using LVPS
transaction data to identify liquidity stress in the market as a whole and at individual
bank level. The stress indicators look at liquidity obtained from the central bank
(monetary loans), unsecured interbank loans (value and interest rate), the use of
collateral and the payments on behalf of their own business and of their clients.
In the case of Mexico, two simulation studies have been conducted by
Alexandrova-Kabadjova and Solís-Robleda [3, 9] to analyze the settlement rules
of SPEI R and the liquidity management of commercial banks that are direct
participants. The authors examined the behavior of the selected financial institutions
related to the reuse of incoming payments. They found that despite the growing
volume of low value payments processed in real time through SPEI R, settlement is
performed efficiently. Furthermore, the authors argue that observed patterns in the
commercial banks’ intraday behavior, particularly in the hours low value payments
are sent, could be a sign of coordination among participants. However, a study
accounting for all direct participants in SPEI R has not been done.
All of these papers look at (transaction level) data of one FMI, i.e. in these papers
an RTGS system. However, they do not consider operational level per type of direct
participants. This paper aims to identify the behavior that characterizes different
types of participants in SPEI R.
19.3 Intraday Liquidity Flows
SPEI R is an LVPS and is operated by Banco de México (BdM). It operates under
an RTGS scheme [10], as a bilateral and multilateral net settlement process is
executed at the latest every 3 s after receiving a new instruction. Low and large value
payments between banks and third parties are processed simultaneously in SPEI R.
The SIAC is system that grant collateralized overdrafts. CLS is the Continuous
Linked Settlement system that processes foreign exchange settlements under a
Payment versus Delivery (PvD) scheme. DALÍ is a Security Settlement System
(SSS) (see [11]).
Figure 19.1a schematically presents the different sectors of direct participants
and infrastructures involved in the liquidity provision. Commercial banks (CB)
and development banks (DB), which are credit institutions (CI), have access to
central bank money in SIAC, as well as accounts in SPEI R and DALÍ. Brokerages
(B) have accounts in SIAC, SPEI R and DALÍ, but do not have direct access to
central bank money, whereas other NBFI have accounts only in SPEI R. In addition,
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Fig. 19.1 Intraday liquidity flows. (a) Liquidity provision. (b) SPEI R volume in 2013
credit institutions and brokerages could also obtain intraday liquidity from the
BdM through government debt repos, which are carried within DALÍ. Figure 19.1b
presents the weighted links that connect SPEI R with the following FMIs: (1) SIAC,
(2) CLS and (3) DALÍ.
Martinez-Jaramillo et al. [12], Bravo-Benitez et al. [13], and Alexandrova-
Kabadjova et al. [14] show how the central bank gives shape to the complex
interaction structure to these liquidity channels. The institutions with direct access
to liquidity provided by the BdM through SIAC, evaluate in advance the level
they need to settle obligations throughout the day in SPEI R and DALÍ. Based
on these pre-evaluated amounts, they then transfer from their accounts in SIAC to
their accounts in SPEI R, and use the accounts in SPEI R and DALÍ to settle their
obligations throughout the day.
19.3.1 An Algorithm for Use of External Funds vs. Incoming
Payments
Given the time structure of the transactional data in SPEI R (semi RTGS), it requires
more liquidity than a (Deferred) Net Settlement (DNS) scheme. Nevertheless,
payments are settled under bilateral and multilateral netting. For that reason it is
important to measure how much this liquidity saving mechanism reduces pressure
on the amount of external funds used. Given the high number of retail payments
settled during a day, we further assume participants use incoming payments to cover
other obligations. This process also reduces the demand for external funds. RTGS
share common features around the globe, nevertheless operational and settlement
rules and institutional frameworks exhibit significant differences among country.
The algorithm we apply for this study is specifically designed for the rules and
institutional framework, under which operates SPEI R.
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The transactional data consists of four elements: time of settlement, institution
that send the payment, institution that receive the payment and the amount of the
transaction. Payments settled at the same netting cycle have the same time stamp.
The algorithm we apply to the transaction data for calculating the level of recycled
and externally funded payments in SPEI R made by institutions looks as follows:
For each cycle:
Ait D Precit  Psentit (19.1)
Fit D Fit1  .Sit1 C Ait/; Sit D 0; if .Sit1 C Ait/ < 0 (19.2)
Sit D .Sit1 C Ait/; if .Sit1 C Ait/ >D 0 (19.3)
where I is the set of participants in SPEI R and T the set of cycles in 1 day. Further,
Precit and P
sent
it are the sum of the incoming and outgoing payment amounts by each
i 2 I in each cycle t 2 T, respectively. Sit is the positive balance for each i 2 I in
each cycle t 2 T, given that Si0 D 0 for all i. Fit is the amount of funds each i 2 I in
each cycle t 2 T has according to the transaction data, given that Fi0 D 0 for all i.
Fi0 and Si0 are set to 0, as the liquidity provision is on a daily basis and does
not transfer to the next day. Sit is an auxiliary variable, i.e. it keeps track of the
incoming funds that are used to cover other obligations in a way that if there is no
availability of such funds, the value of Sit is zero at any time during the day. The
value of Fit, which is a cumulative variable, on the other hand represents the overall
need of external funds, e.g. FiD gives the sum of external funding that institution
i really needed during that day, as D denotes the last settlement period t in the
set T of settlement cycles for the day. From historical data, we have been able to
identify for each real cycle the transactions that have been settled together, such
that each cycle t corresponds to a settlement cycle executed by SPEI R with the
exact transactions corresponding to that cycle. In Fig. 19.2,
P
i2CI.FiD/ is the daily





i2CI.FiD/ will produce the light grey area, where CI stands
for credit institutions, corresponding to the transactions covered with incoming
payments by credit institutions. This area is labeled in the figure as “Recycling CI”.
19.3.2 Different Time-Scale Profiles of SPEI R Participants
Figure 19.2 illustrates the use of external funds vs. incoming payments in SPEI R,
on a daily basis for 2013. The black and lightest grey areas on the bottom show
the need for external funding for CI and NBFI, respectively, whereas the dark grey
and medium grey areas on the top show the proportion of incoming payments used
to cover outstanding obligations for CI and NBFI. The proportion of the use of
incoming payments is calculated as the total payments made by direct participants
in SPEI R minus the evaluated by the algorithm needed external funding on that
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Fig. 19.2 Daily pattern of funding vs. recycling per type of institutions
day. Overall the percentage corresponding to external funds vs. incoming payments
represents 15–85 %, respectively. We further observe that there are two spikes,
corresponding to the daily patterns of March 4th and July 2nd for the study period.
According to the results presented in [15], the increase in the value of external funds
in both cases was used to cover payments initiate by participants and not for third
party payments.
Figure 19.3 presents the accumulated hourly profile by type of SPEI R partici-
pants specifically for CI and NBFI, for the year of 2013. The meaning of colours
is the same as in Fig. 19.2. The majority of payments are executed between 7.00
and 20.00 h. However, some payments are made by between 24:00 and 2:00. These
payments are related to settlements in CLS and their coordination with the European
market.1
Further, we observe that the higher volume of externally funded transaction by
CI is settled between 9:00 and 12:00 (shown in the figure as the black area). Only
Brokerages can get external funds to SPEI R for covering their obligations in this
system from DALÍ. Nevertheless, this represents a very low volume of the overall
transactions in SPEI R. For this reason the detailed intraday information, analysed
and presented in Fig. 19.3, captures the externally financed obligations in SPEI R of
NBFIs, as the very thin brightest grey area above the area of external funds used
by CI. On the other hand, the internally financed or recycled payments of these
institutions are captured by the dark and medium grey areas on the top of the figure.
Obligations covered by CI from incoming payments represent the highest volume
1The CLS coordinates the transfer of currencies, and related payments appear as transactions
between SPEI R participants and CLS. The system operates in Mexico between 24:00 and 5:00,
which corresponds to 7:00–12:00 Central European Time.
























































































































































External Funds CI External Funds NBFI Recycling CI Recycling NBFI
Fig. 19.3 Hourly pattern of funding vs. recycling per type of institutions
of settled transaction between 8:00 and 19:00, accounting for about 85 % of all
transactions. Three peaks of internally financed obligations are observed—at 10:00,
at 13:00 and at 18:00. The volume of payments covered by NBFI is stable during the
daily hours, with an increase between 15:00 and 18:00 h. The analysis further shows
that unsecured lending is taking place in SPEI R from CI to NBFI, which implies
that the area shown as “Incoming payments NBFI” also includes those transactions
and they are costly for the NBFI. In future work, we will focus on extending the
methodology towards detection of transactions redistributing liquidity.
Figure 19.4 shows the average weekly pattern observed during the year 2013 of
interactions among direct participants in SPEI R. We notice overall the behavior of
direct participants is stable. We also observe that the actions taken by CI related to
external funds usage are repetitive during the week. The black area at the bottom
of Fig. 19.4 corresponds to externally financed obligations of CI—CBs and DBs.
Those funds come from SIAC. Contrary, the external funds of NBFI flow from
DALÍ, those funds are shown within a very thin brightest grey area. Next, direct
participants’ internally financed obligations are presented in the upper part of the
figure.
Figure 19.5 introduces the average monthly pattern of the external and internal
funding dynamics of the participants. Here, with the exception of the second day
of month, we observe externally financed payments of CI are relatively stable on
average monthly basis. The volume of internally covered payments by CI exhibits a
more variable pattern during the month, with the highest peak presented at the end.
Finally, the volume of transactions that NBFI covered with incoming payments is
stable on average at monthly basis.
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Fig. 19.5 Monthly pattern of funding vs. recycling per type of institutions
19.4 Summary and Conclusion
Liquidity issues have been one of the strongest lines of research for studies related
to payment systems for over a decade now. This focus reveals the significant role of
liquidity for the sound functioning of financial market infrastructures. The analysis
in this paper contributes to this body of research. We presented an algorithm to
study intraday payment flows in a system, in which around 91 % of the transactions
correspond to retail payments. The algorithm separates funds transferred from other
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FMIs (or provided by a central bank) from the incoming payments from other
participants used to cover obligations. The algorithm determines to what extent
incoming payments are used to cover payment obligations. The framework of
liquidity provision in the Mexican FMIs is used to evaluate the performance of
the developed algorithm, with a particular focus on the high transaction volume
processed by the LVPS. We found that despite the high presence of low value
payments and considering all direct participants in SPEI, the settlement rules are
efficient (see [16]). Nevertheless there is room for improvement if the volume of
retail payments is expected to grow in the future and participants would like to keep
the use of external funds in the lowest possible level. We recommend comparing the
current settlement rules with alternative rules that include the possibility for higher
volume of netting.
The algorithm provides information about the participants’ behavior related to
the use of incoming payments. However, the information about who initiates an
operation (the participant or its client) is still missing from the algorithm. We
need to evaluate to what extent payments initiated by a third party increase the
demand on liquidity or help to reduce the pressure on it through recycling. In
addition, we need to gain more insights into the mechanism for redistribution of
funds among participants, by including the unsecured/secured lending transactions
into the analytical framework from the perspective of systemic relevance analyzed
in [14].
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